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Abstract—This paper presents the first results from the
ongoing research project HASPOC, developing a high assurance
virtualization platform for the ARMv8 CPU architecture. For-
mal verification at machine code level guarantees information
isolation between different guest systems (e.g. OSs) running on
the platform. To use the platform in networking scenarios, we
allow guest systems to securely communicate with each other via
platform-provided communication channels and to take exclusive
control of peripherals for communication with the outside world.
The isolation is shown to be formally equivalent to that of
guests executing on physically separate platforms with dedicated
communication channels crossing the air-gap. Common Criteria
(CC) assurance methodology is applied by preparing the CC
documentation required for an EAL6 evaluation of products using
the platform. Besides the hypervisor, a secure boot component is
included and verified to ensure system integrity.
Keywords—hypervisor, isolation, assurance, formal verification,
Common Criteria, ARMv8.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our daily life and our entire society is increasingly de-
pendent on software and its security and reliability. Software
allows us to make dumb devices smarter and to replace
expensive, inflexible hardware with low-cost, programmable
components and systems. While we cannot remove hardware
completely, we can investigate savings possible from sharing
the same hardware between different software based services.
A fundamental security requirement is to provide isolation
between the different services. In this work the focus lies
on isolation of information, a well-known problem area with
roots in the military/defense sector and research around multi-
level security and access control: allowing plural types of
information with different security classification in the same
computer system, while obtaining high assurance that informa-
tion cannot be accessed in non-authorized ways. Isolation also
helps to minimize the trusted computing base that services
need to rely on. For example, ensuring encrypted network
communication even in cases where the sending commodity
system and the network drivers are compromised. Gradually,
this problem has also become highly relevant in the private
sector with issues around the mix of personal and enterprise
information in the same user device (e.g. a laptop), cloud
computing (allowing users to share pooled resources), network
sharing between mobile operators, etc. Simultaneously, the
problem has also become relevant for most types of ICT
devices, not only for mainframes in data centers, but also for
smart phones and computationally very limited devices such as
embedded systems and sensors. In this work we focus on the
highly popular and successful ARMv8 architecture [1], which
is already common in embedded systems, smartphones, etc,
and also starts to see usage in network infrastructure such as
4G radio base stations.
Platform virtualization is commonly based on a hypervisor,
a software that, to a varying degree of transparency, virtualizes
the underlying resources (CPU, memory, etc.) to a set of
guests sharing these resources. Guests range from simple bare-
metal implementations to complete operating systems with
applications running on top. Although hypervisors must always
ensure some form of separation between the guests in order to
be useful (e.g. ensuring execution correctness), the strength of
isolation between guests can vary, both in terms of the security
methods to control information flow, as well as the assurance
in those methods. Our project includes the development of a
hypervisor with strong isolation in both respects.
The probably highest attainable, yet practically feasible,
assurance level is given by formal verification at machine
code level. This is also the aim of this work. Based on a
formalization of the ARMv8 architecture, interactive theorem
provers and other tools are applied to show that our hypervisor
provides isolation which is essentially equivalent to the isola-
tion provided by identical, but physically separate systems,
each running one guest. The term “essentially equivalent”
is used as a disclaimer regarding certain side-channels, e.g.
from power consumption analysis. Also, we allow inter-guest
communication, controlled by the hypervisor. Through this,
guests may share information, but only via dedicated channels
that were defined at configuration time.
Assurance in the hypervisor is in itself irrelevant unless
we can also provide assurance that the hypervisor has been
properly booted. Therefore, our platform contains a verified
secure boot component which starts the hypervisor in an initial
trusted state where the assumptions of the formal proofs hold.
In the critical infrastructure segment, compliance to the
assurance standard Common Criteria (CC, ISO 15408, [2]) is
typically required, and is also being requested for devices such
as USB drives, SIM-cards etc. CC defines assurance levels
(EAL 1–7), which affects the depth, rigor, and formalism of
the assurance documentation. As part of our work, CC docu-
mentation for EAL6 is produced. Still, our formal verification
in many regards goes beyond what is required for EAL6.
Related verification projects [3], [4], [5] targeted different
architectures, where only seL4 took formal verification down
to machine code level [6] and none of them treated boot loader
verification. The HASPOC project strives for a holistic high-
assurance platform, combining a custom hypervisor, a custom
secure boot, formal verification, and CC. We plan to release
hypervisor and boot solution as open source. The project is
still in progress. Its current status is described in Section VI.
II. THE VIRTUALIZATION PLATFORM
A. Hardware Architecture
For formal verification at machine code level, it is nec-
essary to rely on specifics of the underlying hardware, e.g.,
to assume the correct execution of instructions by the CPU.
In addition, to enforce isolation properties where peripherals
are involved, certain support from the hardware is required.
Specifically, we assume an underlying system-on-a-chip (SoC)
architecture compliant with the ARMv8-A specification [1]
and hardware support in terms of memory management units
(MMUs) providing virtual memory based on two-stage trans-
lation and System MMUs (S-MMU, MMU-400/401 v1) han-
dling peripherals (§IV-B). The CPU must implement all four
exception levels (the protection rings of ARMv8), where the
most privileged one (EL3) is used to execute the secure boot
code and EL2 is used to host our hypervisor. Figure 1 shows a
simplified high level form of the underlying hardware platform.
The hardware must also provide trust anchors (storage of
verification keys) for the secure boot (§IV-A).
B. Use-case examples
Consider a network gateway appliance separating ”red” and
”black” domains, executing on the virtualization platform as
in Fig. 2. Each domain is only available to a dedicated guest,
and any communication between the domains passes through
a third guest, enforcing encryption. Even if both the red and
the black guest (including drivers) are compromised, the trust
in the encryption only depends on the encryption service, the
hypervisor, hardware, and the secure boot (not shown).
In mobile networks, network slicing [7] is an emerging
trend, allowing slices to provide more optimal service delivery
Fig. 1. Platform Overview
Fig. 2. Example Use Case: Encrypting network gateway
for specific types of services. Indeed, slicing may extend
down to the base station [8]. In such settings, purely phys-
ical isolation is no longer cost-efficient. Instead, our solution
enables logical isolation, protecting resource multiplexers from
resource users, as well as resource users from each other.
III. PLATFORM SOFTWARE OVERVIEW
A. Secure Boot
The isolation security objective of the virtualization plat-
form hinges on a trustworthy initialization routine that boots
up the authentic hypervisor with the signed configuration data
(security enforcement policies and other initial parameters) and
guest images in place. In other words, the hypervisor execution
starts in a state were a number of trusted (verified) invariants
hold. This is achieved by the secure boot loader.
1) Background: ARM Trusted Firmware: ARM defines
a Trusted Firmware [9] concept that is built upon ARM’s
TrustZone technology [10] and provided as a reference im-
plementation by ARM. It comprises a three stage secure boot
design where the first boot block (BL1) executes in EL3. BL1
is responsible for verifying integrity of the second boot block,
the ”trusted boot firmware” (BL2), and running it in the ARM
TrustZone secure execution container (Secure EL1). Finally,
BL2 executes a number of boot blocks (BL3x), which set up
the platform configurations etc. The trusted boot firmware also
loads and verifies the application system blocks, including the
hypervisor code if such is present.
2) Boot Overview: The secure boot in our project is based
on the ARM Trusted Firmware reference implementation, but
omits/simplifies certain steps/features. We omit BL2 and a new
simplified but flexible boot block format has been specified,
minimizing functionality and code footprint, making the formal
verification easier and reducing attack surface. The secure boot
loader runs in EL3 and proceeds roughly as follows:
1) Establish trust anchors (verification keys etc) by reading
from secure storage.
2) Read and verify (integrity and authenticity) boot config-
uration information using the trust anchors from step 1.
3) Read and verify boot image (hypervisor).
4) Lower execution privilege level (to ARM EL2) and hand
over execution to the hypervisor.
A failure in any of the verifications will abort the process.
B. Hypervisor
To enable formal verification, a key element is to make
the hypervisor design very simple. As control is handed over
from boot to hypervisor, the hypervisor will take care of
initializing virtual memory and peripheral allocation to guests
by configuring mappings in MMU and S-MMU, according
to configuration data in the loaded boot image. The general
principle is that peripherals are exclusively owned by a specific
guest. Clearly, memory must also be exclusively owned, except
for special memory areas that enable inter-guest communica-
tions (§IV-B2). Exclusive ownership also applies to the CPU
cores: no two guests share the same core. However, one guest
may be assigned multiple cores, and each guest will also be
multiplexed with the hypervisor itself on each of the cores.
IV. DESIGN DETAILS - ASSURANCE ELEMENTS
A. Secure Boot
The secure boot design empoloys the typical multi-stage
approach and is based on ARM Trusted Firmware but with
considerable simplifications to allow formal verification of the
boot code: a static MMU configuration, a simplified control
flow, and two (instead of three) boot stages. The BL2 boot
stage from the ARM Trusted Firmware has been eliminated
and only the most necessary platform set-up blocks from the
last boot stage have been kept, such as power management
drivers and the block implementing the switch from EL3 to
EL2. The whole boot code is executed in EL3 (omitting switch
to/from Secure EL1 to install the payload). In the formal
verification of the boot loader one has to show that EL3-
specific features (e.g. configuring security-related registers,
lowering the exception level) are used as expected.
Images in the boot chain are signed with a private root key.
The trust anchoring requires that a hash of the corresponding
public root key and the first stage boot code are resilient against
tampering. To this end, the first stage loader resides in ROM
and the root key hash can be programmed into a special register
(e.g. eFuse). At power on/reset, the public root key is retrieved
and verified against the trusted hash value. Upon success, the
public key is added as the first item to the list of trusted
keys used to verify subsequent objects in the second stage
boot loader. In this phase, only trusted (SoC-internal) RAM
is used. Depending on the target, the next object to verify
may contain the firmware required to enable use of dynamic
(SoC-external) RAM to store subsequent objects, i.e., the guest
images, their configuration, as well as the hypervisor security
enforcement policies. The final object contains the hypervisor.
After its signature has been verified against the trusted public
root key, the hypervisor is invoked on EL2. The design allows
to add trusted keys into the verification chain (3rd party keys
signed by the private root key), so that guest and configuration
data does not need to be signed with the root key.
B. Hypervisor
The main objective of our hypervisor is to ensure the
isolation of the resources allocated to each guest. Since every
guest owns all its cores exclusively, the hypervisor implements
a security policy focusing on shared hardware components. A
guest must not directly access:
1) hypervisor memory,
2) memory areas of other guests (unless shared in commu-
nication, see below),
3) other guests’ peripherals (but proxy access through com-
munication channels is permitted).
Of course, side effects on foreign resources can occur when
stimulated by inter-guest communication or system calls to the
hypervisor. Below, key enablers of isolation are discussed.
1) Exception levels: The existence of multiple exception
levels allows the hypervisor to be more privileged than guests
when setting up isolation mechanisms. While the boot executes
at EL3, the hypervisor always execute at EL2 and guests are
confined to EL1 or EL0 (e.g. a guest OS can execute at EL1
and its user applications at EL0). The ability for guests to
issue Secure Monitor Calls (SMC) to enter EL3 is disabled at
boot, and any later attempt to invoke SMC will cause a trap to
EL2/hypervisor. During execution, SMC can be used for power
management, but these are intercepted by the hypervisor,
checked/translated and resent from EL2. Another way to reach
EL3 is through exceptions, e.g. interrupts, discussed below.
2) Inter-guest communication (IGC): Since guests are al-
lowed to communicate, information can flow between them.
The hypervisor ensures that only supervised communication
can occur, meaning an information flow explicitly authorized
by and passing through a dedicated resource allocated by the
hypervisor, a so-called communication channel. Authorization
in this context means that these channels are created according
to a parametrized communication policy. Each communication
channel is associated with a unique (sender, receiver)-pair and
is thus in nature uni-directional. No other guests are able to
read or write from the channel. Concretely, a shared memory
area with restricted access permissions is used and interrupts
signal the presence of a message.
3) Memory isolation: Physical memory (of hypervisor and
guests) is exclusively owned. Boundaries are defined in the
runtime configuration. The hypervisor must enforce that a
guest cannot directly (outside the side-effects of IGC) access
or modify information in the memory exclusively owned by
another guest. The MMU provides a two-level mechanism
to first translate virtual addresses into intermediate physical
memory and then to actual physical memory addresses. This
mechanism allows the hypervisor to enforce access control
policy pertaining to guests’ access to the physical memory.
The entries of the second stage page tables that map a guest’s
working memory are statically configured by the hypervisor.
4) Peripheral isolation: Since most peripherals are mem-
ory mapped, guest access to them can be controlled by enforc-
ing the access control policy on associated memory addresses.
However, certain peripherals and CPU internal components are
not fully memory mapped. For example, in ARMv8-A the
floating point co-processor and the physical timers are parts
of the CPU and accessed via special instructions. Since only
one guest is executing on a given core and the hypervisor is
not using these per-core components, their isolation is given by
construction. In any other scenario, if applicable, guest access
could simply be disabled altogether from higher privilege
levels, or the hypervisor could save and restore separate guest
contexts for the registers associated with the peripheral. Some
peripherals have direct access to the buses, e.g., for direct
memory access (DMA). This poses a threat to isolation since
even if the MMU can restrict processor access to memory
and peripherals, it cannot restrict a peripheral’s access to the
bus. For example, a peripheral owned by guest A could write
into memory space of guest B and in a red-black separated
system such as that in Fig. 2, data could potentially flow
directly between interfaces without first passing encryption.
Here, the S-MMU functionality steps in. The S-MMU is a
secondary MMU placed between the peripheral and the system
bus, as shown in Fig. 1. The hypervisor programs the S-MMU
to control which internal resources a peripheral can access.
5) Interrupt handling: In a multi-core system, the interrupt
controller receives messages from various peripherals and
forwards them to the correct cores after appropriate filtering
and priority check. In our case, a guest is permitted access to
interrupts from a peripheral only if that guest owns the latter
and if the policies in the configuration do not block those
interrupts. Thus, the interrupt controller is configured by the
hypervisor to route incoming interrupts to precisely those cores
where the owning guests are located.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY
In order to obtain high assurance of the platform’s isolation
we combine formal verification of the hypervisor design in the
theorem prover HOL4 [11] with a mechanized binary code
verification approach. Both parts depend on a formalization
of the ARMv8 architecture. The overall goal of the formal
verification is to establish a bisimulation between an ideal
model of the system that is secure by construction and the
binary hypervisor implementation. Details of our verification
methodology are depicted in Fig. 3 and explained below.
A. ISA Model
A formal notion of the ARMv8 instruction set architecture
(ISA) is needed in three places: (1) to model the guest
systems that are virtualized, (2) to prove that the hardware
support for virtualization, e.g., the stage-2 MMU as well as
the S-MMU, are configured in a way that ensures the desired
isolation properties, and (3) as a base for the code verification
approach. Thus a suitable ISA model needs to include all
system level functionality available to guests, including the
stage-1 MMU and virtualized system registers, as well as
the stage-2 MMU, the S-MMU, and all instructions that the
hypervisor and secure boot code may execute to implement
the virtualization platform.
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Fig. 3. Overview of the formal verification methodology. Violet boxes show
the actual virtualization platform, i.e., its code and the underlying hardware.
Yellow boxes are handwritten artifacts. Light blue boxes represent derived
artifacts (in HOL4 if not stated otherwise) while green boxes are third-party
tools. Red containers denote results, where ellipses are formalized in HOL4.
Arrows illustrate dependencies.
We extend the pre-existing ARMv8 user mode model by
Fox [12] with the aforementioned system level features to
obtain the desired ISA model, defined in the domain specific
language L3 [13]. The L3 framework allows to generate
corresponding theories in HOL4 and executable SML code.
The HOL4 translation serves as a base for formal proofs of
architectural properties and as an input to our binary code
verification framework. Using the SML representation we have
developed a simulator that runs test programs given in ELF
format. It is part of a testbench where the same tests are run
on ARMv8 hardware in order to validate our ISA model.
B. Top Level Specification & Bisimulation Proof
As mentioned before, the virtualization platform should
resemble a system where all guests are running on their
own isolated virtual machines with private memories, only
communicate through dedicated channels, and have exclusive
access to the peripherals associated with them. We formalize
this idea in HOL4 and define an ideal model of the system
that has these desired properties by construction.
Additionally, we capture the design of the virtualization
platform in a refined model that closely follows its C and
assembly implementation, describing internal data structures
and control flow of the hypervisor and secure boot loader. Thus
we obtain a functional representation of the C and assembly
code in HOL4. We use this specification later to derive function
contracts for the binary code verification.
The aim is to show that the ideal model simulates the
refined one, i.e., that all computations of the refined model can
be represented in the ideal model where guests are isolated by
construction. Since we also want to cover information flow
properties like confidentiality, a simple refinement proof is
insufficient. We instead prove a bisimulation.
The bisimulation relation maps refined guest states to ideal
guest states in the obvious way, taking into account the second-
stage translation and stored CPU contexts that are only visible
in the refined model. Internal hypervisor steps and states only
become visible in the ideal model if they are observable by
the guests, e.g., through the effect of hypercalls. The secure
boot loader is invisible in the ideal model; we prove that the
bisimulation relation holds for the initial state after execution
of the boot and hypervisor initialization code.
Inherently, the bisimulation proof relies on the components
guaranteeing memory, peripheral, and interrupt separation. For
memory separation we show that the second-stage MMU is
configured initially in a way that isolates private guest mem-
ories properly and that this configuration is never changed.
For peripheral separation we prove a similar property for the
S-MMU. Interrupt separation relies mainly on the fact that
the hypervisor injects interrupts into the right guests, as all
interrupts are routed through the hypervisor by the current
generation of ARM interrupt controllers. Further isolation
properties guaranteed by the architecture are, e.g., that guests
cannot access hypervisor and TrustZone registers or execute
certain instructions. We are in the process of developing semi-
automated proof tools that allow to deduce these kind of
properties for different architecture models.
C. Binary Code Verification
To show that the refined model correctly captures the
binary implementation of the virtualization platform, we use
the refined model as a functional specification for the binary
code and prove functional correctness of the latter. We follow
an approach that has successfully been tried and tested on a
previous ARMv7 version of the hypervisor [14], [15].
Technically we employ the Binary Analysis Platform
(BAP) [16] to perform the formal analysis based on a rep-
resentation of the ARMv8 assembly semantics that we derive
from our HOL4 model through a so-called Lifter. The Lifter
is a HOL4 procedure that evaluates a given ARMv8 program
according to the HOL4 model and generates a corresponding
program in BAP’s internal language, that is annotated based
on the function contracts derived from the refined model. It
also gives a proof that both programs behave equivalently.
For each translated code fragment we use BAP to deduce
the weakest pre-condition for the given post-condition. Finally
an SMT solver is employed to show that this weakest pre-
condition is implied by the actual pre-conditions from the
function contracts. Thus we obtain that the binary code of the
virtualization platform correctly implements the refined speci-
fication and—through the bisimulation proof—also resembles
the ideal model.
VI. CURRENT STATUS
Prototypes of secure boot and hypervisor have been im-
plemented on several different ARMv8 platforms, such as the
ARM Cortex A53 HiKey and ARM Juno boards. We have been
able to securely boot multiple Linux guests on these boards,
proving the feasibility of the suggested approach. Hypervisor,
guests, and guest configurations are statically defined. There
are no provisions made for dynamically spawning more guests,
only those guests that are defined at boot time are executed.
So far the verification work has focused on developing the
ARMv8 model and the top level specification. The current
ISA model covers all relevant registers and instructions of the
four exception levels (excluding interrupt semantics) as well
as the 2-stage MMU (excluding TLBs). Memory is currently
modeled in sequentially consistent fashion excluding caches,
but we plan to cover weakly consistent behaviour of guests
in the future. The certifying Lifter interfacing BAP has been
implemented for Fox’s original ARMv8 model.
Formal verification cannot cover information flow through
“analog” side channels such as power consumption or timing
behaviour. For instance, sensitive information might leak be-
tween guests through access time discrepancies on the shared
L2 cache. One way to close this channel is to partition the L2
cache lines between guests (cache coloring). Another option is
to adapt guest software such that its cache line access patterns
do not leak sensitive information.
For the Common Criteria work, a so called Security Target
(ST) with the required supporting design documentation is be-
ing written. While the formal verification aspects of assurance
requires us to rely on details of the ARMv8-A specification
[1], the situation is somewhat different for the CC assurance
since the CPU itself is considered outside the boundary of the
verified component (the so called TOE). Thus, large parts of
the ST might be re-usable also for another CPU architecture.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a solution for isolating critical from
commodity software on ARMv8, while still providing con-
trolled communication. The virtualization based approach al-
lows secure resource sharing between different parties and the
minimization of the trusted computing base that services need
to rely on. For example, we can enforce encryption between
network domains, even in cases where the sending commodity
system and the network drivers are compromised. Particularly
strong assurance is achieved by a holistic trust framework.
Our hypervisor is small in size, currently 8 kLOC and 38 KB
and thus suitable for formal verification on binary level. Its
uncompromised execution is rooted in a secure boot scheme.
The overall solution is suitable for Common Criteria certifi-
cation and we provide the required starting points towards an
EAL6 certification of a concrete product which is based on
this high assurance virtualization platform. More information
on the ongoing research project and open source releases will
be made available via [17].
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